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Abstract
Voter-verifiable voting systems place significant demands of both effort and knowledge onto ordinary
voters who have only limited incentives to participate. We suggest the use of third-party verifiable voting
systems, harnessing the very strong incentives for candidates and observers to verify that votes are correctly
counted. A generic modification enabling this via the use of pre-filled ballots and secure depositing is
outlined and we demonstrate this modification by applying it to two major voter-verifiable voting systems.
Additionally, potential vulnerabilities of this approach are discussed.
1. Introduction
Receipt-free, voter-verifiable voting systems are the
current gold standard in electronic voting system
research, with numerous authors having proposed
a plethora of schemes, including Scantegrity [1, 2];
ThreeBallot [3]; Scratch and vote [4, 5]; Chaum’s
visual cryptography scheme [6]; Prêt à Voter [7, 8];
Randell and Ryan’s scheme modelled on fruit ma-
chines [9]; Reynolds’s scheme [10] and voter verified
secured paper audit trails [11].
A Receipt-free voter-verifiable (RFVV) scheme en-
ables a voter to obtain assurances that the election
has been operated fairly and that their vote has been
counted, without the unfortunate side-effect of reveal-
ing the voter’s choice to anyone else (and violating
voting privacy, a requirement in many democratic
jurisdictions). This property mitigates the perceived
difficulty of verifying the machinery of an election
directly (as is done in paper-based elections) due to
the complexity and opacity of computer-based tech-
nology. As a consequence, elections can leverage the
greater efficiency and accuracy of computer based
elections, without compromising on the integrity or
transparency of the result. An important characteris-
tic of receipt-free voting is that voters themselves must
not be able to prove how they voted; this prevents
voters from being coerced or bribed.
In a typical RFVV scheme, a voter interacts with
the voting system in a secure, isolated environment,
such as a polling booth, to vote and also construct a
witness for their vote. The witness is a document that
provides the voter with some assurance that their vote
has been counted correctly (that the voting system
has committed to the value of their vote and cannot
change it without detection). Most commonly this
witness is constructed using cryptographic methods
that allow some information about the vote to be
recorded, without revealing the particular candidate
or option voted for. As a result, the voter cannot use
their witness to prove how they voted.
The voter must submit their vote to the voting
system, just as in a paper based election. However,
unlike the vote, the voter may remove the witness from
the polling station and use it later to audit information
published about the election by the voting system. If
the witness shows that the voter’s choice has not been
correctly counted the voter may be able to have the
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result overturned or corrected. Crucially, the witness
only provides sufficient information for the voter to
confirm that their vote has been correctly counted:
it does not provide sufficient information for a third
party to reconstruct how the voter voted.
A necessary consequence of the use of a RFVV
scheme for an election is that responsibility for as-
suring an election result is placed on the voters in
the election. This is significant: the design of vot-
ing schemes is often treated as a purely technical
or even theoretical problem, in which the various
actors are treated as neutral agents or software pro-
cesses. However, voting schemes are implemented as
socio-technical voting systems, involving a range of
organisations and actors all with their own expecta-
tions, incentives and capabilities. These factors can
impose significant constraints on the design of a voting
scheme.
By contrast, the design of all RFVV schemes makes
several implicit assumptions about the majority of
voters who participate in real elections:
• That voters understand the general purpose of
the verification method and the information pro-
vided (and not provided) by the witness.
• That voters can perform the witness construction
process correctly and determine if their witness
is an accurate encoding of their vote.
• That voters are able to correctly operate the
vote verification mechanism and can distinguish
between a correctly and incorrectly counted vote.
• That voters are motivated to perform the verifi-
cation of their vote using the witness.
• That voters are able and willing to invoke dispute
resolution procedures if they believe their witness
is incorrectly recorded.
The available research suggests that all of these
assumptions may be unsafe. A study undertaken using
the Prêt à Voter scheme identified several problems
and showed that had difficulties understanding several
of the key Prêt à Voter concepts and mechanisms [12].
Voters were unsure why they had to separate the two
columns of the ballot paper and destroy the left hand
column containing the ordering of candidates. One
group in the study failed to destroy it at all, leading
to a degraded mode of operation that threatened vote
secrecy.
Once they had obtained their receipt many partic-
ipants were disappointed by the unintuitive nature
of it; some expected a document saying who they
actually voted for, rather than the weaker guarantees
required to maintain receipt-freeness. At the veri-
fication stage participants again expressed apathy -
some participants opined that current elections run
fine without the use of receipts and others felt that
the comparison of receipts to bulletin-board values
did not provide them with useful information. Storer
et al. [13] identified similar limitations in a study of a
scheme with significantly simpler verification mecha-
nisms (that was not receipt-free). Additionally, stud-
ies of the usability of voter-verifiable voting systems
( such as Winckler et al. [14]’s study of Prêt à Voter
) suggest that voters considered such methods less
usable than paper- or machine-based alternatives.
Voters’ uptake of the post-election verification pro-
cesses tends to be low, such as the 4% recorded during
a real-world deployment of Scantegrity [15]. It is cur-
rently difficult to quantify what level of uptake is
necessarily to obtain reasonable confidence in the ac-
curacy of the result. Risk-limiting audits can provide
high confidence with very small samples [16], but this
relies on obtaining a random sample of ballots, while
the self-selecting sample of verifying voters is likely
to be demographically biased.
Separately, the verification elements of the system
in the Prêt à Voter study also led the participants
to doubt the security of the system. In broad terms
they felt that a secure system would not need verifi-
cation and so conversely the presence of verification
must imply a risk of insecurity and consequently be
untrustworthy. This perception was also detected dur-
ing trials for public body elections in the Netherlands
[17].
Consequently, this paper argues that existing RFVV
schemes do not take adequate account of the socio-
technical context in which voting takes place. Specifi-
cally, RFVV schemes assume capabilities and motiva-
tions on the behalf of voters that are not realistic in
a real election context.
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RFVV schemes generally ignore the other actors
in a voting system and the role that they might play
in assuring the correctness of a result. In established
democracies, the voting system has evolved in theory
and practice to support the role the candidates and
other participants play, and practical verifiable voting
systems should harness these resources as well.
Political candidates and parties play an important
role in the running and auditing of elections. In the
United Kingdom, the candidate’s appointed counting
agents act as scrutineers of election results, alongside
election administrators and independent observers
[18]. The parties’ records from supporters and can-
vassing can also be used to ‘sanity check’ the results of
the election. This arrangement reflects the very strong
incentives for candidates to ensure the correct count-
ing of votes, as this could make the difference between
winning and loosing the election. While each individ-
ual candidate has no incentive to ensure that votes
for other candidates are correctly counted (indeed,
they have incentives to encourage the opposite) the
candidates as an aggregation have strong incentives
to ensure that all votes are correctly counted.
In many countries an important role is also played
by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which
aim to promote effective democracy and the fair run-
ning of elections. These can include international
bodies and observers (e.g. the OCSE), domestic cam-
paign groups (e.g. the Electoral Reform Society in
the UK) and civic organisations (e.g. the League of
Women Voters). These organisations are non-partisan,
and often run campaigns to improve turnout and com-
bat electoral fraud. In less mature democracies the
reports of these organisations contribute significantly
to the international recognition (or not) of the fair-
ness of the result. It is therefore important that any
implementation of RFVV systems provides similar
opportunities for external observation and audit as
currently used paper-based elections, which has been
identified as a difficulty by the Council of Europe [19].
Consequently, this paper proposes that the limita-
tions of voter verification can be mitigated by harness-
ing the motivation and resources of third-parties to
ensure fair elections. The paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 examines related work on third-parties
in electronic voting and other secure systems. Section
3 outlines a generic adaptation to RFVV schemes that
allows the act of election verification to be transferred
from voters to third parties without violating voting
privacy. Section 4 applies the adaptation to several
existing RFVV schemes and analyses the modifica-
tion for the introduction of vulnerabilities. Section
5 examines different configurations of the generic ap-
proach and discusses the viability of several attacks
on the generic principle. Section 6 concludes with an
overview of the paper and outlines the advantages of
this approach.
2. Related Work
Relatively little previous work has considered the
role of third-parties in verifiable elections, but some
important aspects have been discussed.
In their paper on Scratch & Vote Adida and Rivest
[5] suggest a goal of cryptographic voting is to ‘trust
third parties as little as possible’. However, they
also suggest the use of ‘helper organisations’ includ-
ing political parties and campaign groups who would
provide the equipment necessary for voters to per-
form their pre-voting validation, presumably via by
their presence in the polling station. Similarly, Rivest
and Smith [3] sketch out a modified version of their
OneBallot system where voters receive the receipts
of previous voters and suggest the involvement of
external organisations to verify the receipts’ digital
signatures.
The most substantial work on third-party verifica-
tion is by Neumann et al. [20], who propose the use of
third-party websites and mobile apps to verify votes
cast using the Helios [21] remote electronic voting sys-
tem. In this adaptation, respected third-parties pro-
vide services by which voters can verify both whether
their vote has been correctly constructed and whether
it has been correctly stored. This is performed by com-
municating the voter’s witness to a third-party, which
then performs the necessary cryptographic checks.
User studies using prototype websites suggest a high
but not complete rate of success (~80%) in using
these verification services. However, this differs from
the scheme presented in this paper in a number of
important ways:
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• Their work applies to remote voting, while our
scheme is designed for in-person voting.
• Their scheme reduces the amount of effort re-
quired for voters to verify, while ours allows dele-
gate away this effort entirely.
• In their scheme challenges must still be initiated
by individual voters, rather than by third-parties.
More generally the use of third-party organisations
and systems to address usability issues and improve
security can be seen in other domains, such as the
increasingly widespread use of password managers.
While the introduction of such tools can introduce ad-
ditional vulnerabilities [22] they can address users’ dif-
ficulties in managing complex security requirements.
3. Third-Party Verifiability
Figure 1 illustrates the generic arrangement of
a receipt-free voter verification scheme. A typical
scheme assumes that voting takes place in a secure
environment, realised by a polling booth, in which
the voter can exchange information with the voting
system that cannot be leaked to another actor.
The voter engages in a cut and choose protocol
[23] with the voting system to prepare a vote and a
witness for the vote. The witness is a partial, encoded
form of the vote - it contains information that can be
used to verify that a voter is correctly processed, but
cannot be used to determine the voting intent itself.
In this approach, the voter is provided with a vote
and witness by the system, and can choose whether
to cast the vote or immediately audit the witness for
correctness. As a result the protocol forces the voting
system to decide whether to prepare a valid or corrupt
witness before the voter performs any checks, as it
not possible to determine whether the witness will be
audited or not.
After voting has completed the results and pro-
cessed by the voting system and made publically avail-
able. The voter can then use their witness to confirm
that their vote has been counted accurately, but not
demonstrate how they voted to a third party.
Receipt-free voter-verifiable (RFVV) schemes there-
fore impose load on the voter at two main points:
witness generation and post-election verification. At
the witness generation stage some property of the
voter’s intention is recorded, often in a cryptographic
manner. It is critically important that the witness
is a well-formatted encoding of that property, but
the voter may well not have the understanding or re-
sources needed to check that the witness does indeed
match their actual vote. At the verification stage
the voter must check that their witness corresponds
accurately to a published record, but they may not
understand the procedure, and lack incentives to do
so.
In both these stages it is possible to replace the
voter as the verifying actor and transfer the respon-
sibility to third parties, harnessing their increased
incentive and motivation to ensure that votes are
correctly formatted and that their presence in the
count is verified. The use of pre-filled ballots and se-
cure anonymous channel witness gathering as outlined
here is a simple method that can be applied to most
existing voter-verifiable voting systems.
During the run-up to the election the ballot is de-
signed in the normal way for the particular voter-
verifiable voting system in use. However, no blank
ballots are provided to voters: instead, a sufficient
quantity of pre-marked ballots for each candidate
(more generally, each potential voting option) are
produced. These are produced by the authorities
and examined by the third party observers (by cut-
and-choose or similar method). To preserve receipt-
freeness these examined ballots should be discarded,
rather than being used. During this process observers
ensure that ballot are pre-filled in the correct way,
and that the witness (also pre-printed) is correctly
structured. This effectively replaces the need for the
voter to perform the cut-and-choose protocol, simpli-
fying their voting experience and removing the need
for them to understand the underlying cryptographic
features. These problems were identified in the use of
Scantegrity in Takoma Park [15], where pollworkers
suggested that pre-produced receipts would help voter
understanding and improve usability.
After the observers are satisfied with their checks,
new sets of prepared ballots are then loaded into sim-
ple mechanical dispensing machines that are deployed
to the polling stations, potentially after a further third-
4
Figure 1: A generic Receipt-Free Voter Verifiable Voting scheme
party check of correctness on these machines. The
voter then uses said dispensing machine within the
privacy of the polling booth, which issues a pre-filled
vote/witness pair for the voter’s chosen candidate.
The chosen ballot can then be folded over or sealed
within an envelope to hide the choice, and then be
cast be in the traditional manner. (Variations on the
concept of pre-filled ballots are already in use in sev-
eral democracies, such as the ‘ballot letters’ in Israel
and ‘bulletins’ of France, and in both cases sealed
envelopes are used)
After casting their ballot the voter is then able
to deposit their witness securely and anonymously
(such as via ballot boxes or more elaborate methods)
with the candidate or external organisation of their
choice. Depositing their witness with the candidate
they voted for harnesses the strongest incentives, but
the participation of non-candidate organisations pro-
vides freedom of choice to the voter, and reduces the
potential leaking of voting intention by implication.
Once the result has been declared the candidates and
organisations verify the witnesses deposited with them
using the standard process for the voting system, and
challenge the results if necessary in the usual manner.
The overall procedure is highly similar to the RFVV
arrangement, and is illustrated in Figure 2.
This approach can be applied effectively to any elec-
toral system where it is possible to refine selections
down to a small number of ‘tickets’ (by political party
or otherwise), due to the need to limit the number of
different pre-filled ballot permutations. This includes
simple majoritarian (first-past-the-post) elections and
referendums as well as proportional representation
or mixed-member systems that use closed party lists.
Additionally, it is broadly compatible with systems
that require exhaustive preferences where parties pub-
lish guides to their voters describing the parties’ ideal
set of preferences, such as in Australian Senate elec-
tions. This approach is unlikely to be suitable for
elections using preferential voting or elections fea-
turing large numbers of distinct candidates, as the
number of ballot permutations becomes intractable.
4. Applications
The use of pre-filled ballots allows voter-verifiable
voting systems to be easily converted into third-party
verifiable voting systems, while allowing the same
procedures to be used and the same security properties
obtained as in the original, unmodified system. This
section of the paper examines adapted versions of
Scantegrity and Prêt à Voter . In each case a brief
outline of the original system is provided, followed
by details of the adaptations made. In particular,
risks and attack vectors introduced or removed by the
modifications are examined.
4.1. Scantegrity
Scantegrity is a witness-based voter-verifiable vot-
ing system that is widely studied, and one of the few to
be used for binding political elections [1]. The Scant-
egrity ballot takes the form of a standard machine
readable bubble ballot, with two important additions.
Cryptographically generated code letters are placed
beside the name of each candidate, and a unique serial
number is printed in both human and machine read-
able forms. After voting, the voter separates off part
of the ballot containing a copy of the serial number,
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Figure 2: Conceptual model of third-party verifiability
and they should also record the code letters for their
chosen candidate. After counting the serial numbers
and code letters for the selected candidate are pub-
lished. The voter can then check that their own record
of the code letters matches the published version. If
they do not match the voter can challenge the result,
but the dispute resolution process is fairly unintu-
itive, although later versions of Scantegrity offer some
improvements.
The pre-filling process is straightforward at the
ballot preparation stage, but can be used to later
simplify the dispute resolution process. The appropri-
ate code letters can be pre-printed onto the witness
portion of the ballot, and secured by the use of wa-
termarks or similar security techniques. As a result
the complex process necessary to protect against mali-
cious disputes can be eliminated, making verification
much more streamlined. Malicious election authorities
might attempt to deliberately print the wrong code
letters on the witness to cast doubt on the accuracy
of the election, but as this can be detected by a visual
check the practicality of this attack is limited.
The voter’s experience is simple, as they merely
have to select the candidate of their choice and check
that the correct candidate is marked on the dispensed
ballot. The ballot and witness can be issued on the
same piece of paper (as in classic Scantegrity), or they
can be pre-separated, ensuring that the two parts are
distinguishable and that the voter does not leave the
witness attached when casting their ballot.
After casting the vote witnesses are deposited with
the voter’s choice of candidate or observer via a secure
and anonymous system. At the close of polls the
serial numbers and code letters are published to a
bulletin-board as standard, and those in possession of
the ballots can check that all their witnesses appear
correctly in the published list. If there is discrepancy
they can challenge the election authorities using their
witness. The use of pre-filled, watermarked witnesses
means that the challenger has strong evidence that
their witness is authentic so changes to the record and
investigations into the cause of the discrepancy can
begin without the need to perform a lengthy procedure
to test the validity of the witness.
4.2. Prêt à Voter
Prêt à Voter was one of the first voter-verifiable
voting systems using a similar ballot layout to con-
ventional paper voting [8]. The Prêt à Voter ballot
consists of two columns - the left column contains
the list of candidates (in alphabetical order with a
random offset) and the right column contains spaces
for marking the vote as well as an alphanumeric value
known the onion. The onion is a representation of
the candidate ordering that has been public key en-
crypted by a sequence of tellers. The voter marks
the right column alongside the appropriate candidate,
then separates and destroys the left column. This
leaves only the right column, which merely has one
marked section and the onion. This column is fed into
an optical scanner within the polling booth, which
records this information and transfers it to the central
election server and then returns the column. At the
close of polls the tellers acting together can decode
the onion to reveal the ordering and hence work out
which candidate was voted for. The voter is then
able to check that their vote (identifiable by the onion
value) has been included in the count, and that their
mark is recorded in the correct section.
6
At ballot production pre-filled Prêt à Voter requires
minimal modifications. The appropriate section of the
right-hand column is marked. When voting the voter
simply need check the correct candidate is marked.
One common problem encountered during the Prêt à
Voter focus groups was that voters did not understand
the importance of separating the two columns, and so
there is an argument for providing the two elements
to the voter separately in the first place, or even not
providing the left column at all. However, the voter
cannot check the correctness of their vote from the
right column alone and so maintaining the standard
layout is important to improve voter confidence. In-
stead the voter could be issued with two ballots each
containing both columns, with one marked ballot and
one marked witness. The separation of the columns is
normally used to provide coercion resistance for the
voter, but this is unnecessary in a compulsory deposit
system, as the voter never leaves the polling station
with the witness, which is instead anonymously de-
posited, breaking the link to the individual voter and
the possibility of coercion.
Having cast their ballot and deposited their witness
the voter’s role is complete, and the election results
are produced and the witnesses are published to a
bulletin-board. The candidates and observers check
for the presence and correctness of the witnesses they
hold and can challenge the results if necessary using
the standard Prêt à Voter procedure.
5. Discussion
The general approach outlined earlier presents one
possible configuration of a third party-verifiable vot-
ing system. Different configurations are possible using
the same principles; different configurations offer a
subtly different balance of strengths and weaknesses
and may be more suitable in particular contexts and
applications. There are three main sections that can
be configured differently - ballot creation, ballot de-
positing and compulsion of deposit.
Additionally, the move to a third-party verifiable
voting system changes the security properties of a
voting system. The advantages of such an approach
have already been outlined, but changes to security
assumptions and new potential attacks are discussed
below.
5.1. Ballot Creation
Pre-marked ballot papers must be prepared in suf-
ficient quantities prior to the opening of the polls.
These should be produced and marked by the election
authorities, with the third-party observers auditing a
proportion. This approach most closely matches cur-
rent electoral procedures, and offers efficiencies of scale
in production. The exact details of the pre-marking
should be agreed in advance to provide confidence in
their accuracy, and observers should be able to cut-
and-choose which ballots they wish to inspect. In this
approach the primary risk comes from the election
authorities attempting to discriminate against certain
candidates by malforming their ballot or manipulating
the witness element. Candidates without sufficient
resources may not be able to check enough ballots
to detect subtle attacks, so the participation of other
third parties to check these ballots provides additional
safeguards.
5.2. Witness Depositing Mechanisms
The depositing of witnesses is required to transfer
the information encoded in the witness from the voter
to a third party. This process needs to be secure
and offer one-way anonymity (the party receiving the
receipt should not be able to identify which voter it
came from). Additionally, it is preferable that the
voter’s choice of third party should be private so that
inferences on voting intention cannot be drawn.
The simplest way to implement this process is to
provide a selection of additional ballot boxes in each
polling station, with each third party assigned their
own box. While straightforward, this approach does
not provide any privacy for the voter, and so those
within the polling station may be able to guess at
their voting intention based on their choice of third
party. To obtain voter privacy while maintaining the
public aspect of the ballot box (which acts as a pro-
tection against stuffing and removal of receipts) a
mechanical box could be constructed that enables the
voter to choose between third parties using a switch
or dial. The public nature of the box itself is pre-
served, but the voter’s choice of third party is kept
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private. This approach offers good privacy, but may
not be easy to construct or maintain, and risks voters
making the wrong selection or not understanding the
system. A comprise between usability and privacy
can be obtained by using an optical scanner to record
the witness, details of which can be transferred elec-
tronically to the third party. This type of device is
already in wide use for recording ballots, and can be
programmed to provide a rich user interface. DRE
systems can be attacked to leak information or discard
ballots, but the consequences of such attacks are less
severe when scanning witnesses than when scanning
actual votes.
5.3. Compulsory Depositing
Third-party verifiable systems move the primary
responsibility for witness verification from voters to
candidates and external observers. This move can be
either partial or complete; voters may or may not still
have the option to verify their vote themselves. Com-
pulsory deposit schemes offer a number of advantages
over partial depositing. If witnesses are not removed
from the secure environment of the polling station it
becomes possible to include more information on them
without endangering security or privacy; witnesses in
a partial depositing system must stop the voter from
revealing their choice of vote, but this necessity is
eliminated if the witness does not leave the polling
station.
Witnesses are instead only required to be anony-
mous when deposited, enabling considerably simpler
methods of vote challenging to be enabled by encoding
more information in the witness. The voting experi-
ence is made simpler, as the voter is not required to
consider the possibility of verifying their vote them-
selves. This approach may also increase the propor-
tion of votes verified, if candidates and observers can
be assumed to verify all or the large majority of votes
deposited with them. This approach necessarily as-
sumes that the removal of witnesses from the polling
station can be prevented, akin to the existing practices
for deterring chain voting.
However, the compulsory deposit scheme does not
provide any option for the voter who distrusts both
the election authorities and all avaliable third parties,
as they are unable to verify the correctness of the
election independently.
5.4. Security Assumptions
The security and privacy properties of receipt-free
verifiable voting systems are subject to a set of assump-
tions, which vary according to the particular structure
and design of each system. These assumptions may
include the behaviour of the voters or the election
authorities (such as assuming a certain threshold of
authorities are trustworthy) as well as assumptions
about the technical factors in the system design (such
that certain cryptographic operations cannot be effec-
tively reversed).
In general, a third-party verifiable modification to
an existing voter-verifiable voting system should re-
quire only a minimal set of additional security as-
sumptions on top of those in the original system. As
in a voter-verifiable system, the detection of electoral
manipulation requires that a suitable proportion (that
is both large and random enough) of verifiers actually
perform verification; accuracy of the result cannot be
assured if third-parties are lax in their verification.
The receipt-freeness of the election (and the inability
of the voter to prove their vote, even if they wish to)
is guaranteed by the existing voting system design
(and subject to the assumptions therein) assuming the
existence of a truly anonymous channel for witness
deposit.
Some specific variants of third-party verification
also rely on additional assumptions. Compulsory
depositing relies on the assumption that either the
electoral authorities or a suitable well-resourced and
independent third party can be trusted; if this assump-
tion is false (such as in an authoritarian one-party
state) then manipulation cannot be detected. Addi-
tionally, it assumed that witnesses can be prevented
from leaving the polling station. Similarly, the cre-
ation of pre-marked ballots assumes a trustworthy
authority or at least one independent observer.
5.5. Potential Attacks
The use of pre-filled ballots means that significantly
more ballots are produced, and that all these ballots
are potentially valid votes. This places additional
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emphasis on the need for strong chains of custody and
rigorous polling station procedures. If a proportion
of the uncast pre-filled ballots were obtained by an
attacker they could be used for a ballot stuffing attack,
which would be easy to detect but difficult to correct.
Additionally, an attacker obtaining pre-filled ballots
could separate off the witness elements, and pass them
on to one of the candidates. This candidate could
them claim that these votes had been ignored by the
election authorities, and use the witness as proof of
this. This type of attack can only be addressed if
comprehensive records of the issued ballots are kept.
By moving the process of ballot verification (e.g. by
‘cut and choose’) to before the opening of polls, this
approach may make it easier for malicious election
authorities to manipulate ballots. Good physical se-
curity should prevent the authorities from modifying
existing ballots or inserting additions between the
verification phase and the actual dispensing to the
voters, but it is easier to mount an attack when the
process of verification is planned in advance. This
can be addressed by allowing third parties to ran-
domly inspect the stockpiles of ballots and dispensers
at polling stations during the voting period, enabling
them to detect modifications if they lack trust in the
physical security of the election.
The use of a dispensing machine provides a point
of attack, although this device is less vulnerable than
electronic voting devices. The machine may be ma-
nipulated to dispense the wrong ballot for particular
candidates, but this attack can be easily detected by
the voter when they see that another candidate is
marked on their ballot paper (this attack becomes
more effective if used against a voting system with
complex ballots that the voter may not understand,
such as ThreeBallot). In theory ballot stuffing could
be encouraged by the ability to obtain multiple ballots
from the dispenser; this can be alleviated by enforc-
ing a timeout between the dispensing of ballots, akin
to the delay on Indian EVMs. The device could be
bugged in order to obtain partial information as the
election is ongoing, but the same level of information
could be leaked in any system that uses a polling
station based ballot scanner.
The distribution of witnesses to (multiple) third
parties provides these entities with potentially signifi-
cant partial information about ongoing voting. The
strength of this information is related to the properties
of the witness; in classic Scantegrity and Prêt à Voter
it is not possible to determine the voter’s choice from
the witness (receipt-freeness), although this would be
possible in the modified version of Prêt à Voter sug-
gested above. However, the simple act of depositing a
witness with a third-party provides that third-party
with information about the number of votes cast and
the likely voter turnout. However, there are two main
reasons that this partial information is of limited use
to a malicious third-party. Firstly, the proportion of
voters who deposit their witnesses with any specific
third-party is unpredictable and usually (depending
on the physical layout and security of the polling sta-
tion) unmeasurable while the vote is ongoing. As a
result, it is not practical to extrapolate wider pre-
dictions from a set of deposited ballots. Secondly,
ongoing turnout information is often published by
election authorities at certain intervals; the only ad-
vantage from witness-derived information would be if
it was obtainable at a more granular level than official
announcements.
A number of practical attacks have already been
documented on the Scantegrity and Prêt à Voter sys-
tems, and these are not discussed here unless the
modification particularly enhances or diminishes their
threat.
6. Conclusion
Voter-verifiable voting systems place significant de-
mands on the voter during ballot completion, witness
comparison and post-election verification. If voters
do not complete or understand these processes the
benefits of the systems can be lost, and additional
problems introduced in terms of system usability and
security. Unfortunately voters lack incentives to par-
ticipate fully and knowledgeably in such systems, and
evaluation evidence shows a significant lack of under-
standing and deviation from required procedure.
In contrast candidates and third-party observers
have the incentives and motivation to verify that votes
cast actually counted, and hence have the desire and
resources to perform effective, large-scale verification.
A generic system of pre-filled ballots has been outlined
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that allows ballot completion and witness comparison
to be performed in advance of the vote by the candi-
dates and election authorities. Combined with the use
of a secure polling station depositing system allowing
transfer of the witnesses to third-parties this generic
approach eliminates the main areas of cognitive load
from the voter’s experience, while maintaining the
security properties and audibility advantages of voter-
verifiable systems. Applying this approach to two
major voter-verifiable voting systems shows that only
simple changes are needed to apply it in practice and
in some cases it can provide additional benefits in
addition to those obtained from the move away from
voter-verification.
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